Alpaca Nutrition information, tips and advice

Without access to markets for export, the national tourist market became the initial focus for the group's knitting activities. Their prior experience knitting for export allowed them to offer sweaters of a superior quality to those available from most local market vendors. Without the exorbitant overhead expenses of a large organization, they were able to offer the same or better products as the other export-quality knitwear producers, but at a cheaper price. Julia, one of the knitters, described the amazement she felt when she approached a tourist coming out of a Cochabamba knitwear store and was able to sell a scarf for what seemed to her to be a fortune! This experience convinced the women that there was indeed a market for their products.

Since the early 1980s, after a number of fits and starts, the women of La Imilla have distinguished themselves through the quality of the beautiful sweaters they produce and, contrary to dour expectations about the efficacy of rural women's organizations, the Association has prospered. In addition to providing an alternate, cooperative framework for production, La Imilla has raised the consciousness of knitters about their relationship to labor markets, and conducts broader educational activities and workshops with its members. Topics covered by the group over the years have included literacy and math skills, nutrition, women's rights, ethnic identity, and even local politics. Membership in the productive activities of the cooperative and participation in these workshops has promoted a positive sense of identity among knitters. In fact, the distinctly "feminist" tone and "politicized" tenor of La Imilla's rhetoric and activities have evoked opposition and occasionally confrontation in local arenas dominated by men and controlled by party politics. But the unique history and social philosophy of the group has brought the women of La Imilla international attention, giving them access to financial aid and to international markets for their products. By 1991, the group had grown to more than 50 knitters and exported almost 2000 sweaters.

Studies of artisans from other parts of the world illustrate that this sort of intensified craft production can affect relationships within a community (Nash 1993a). In some cases, existing patterns of production may be maintained. Often, however, successful production for the market can undermine the social structures, which are the foundation of that production (Stephen 1991). In other cases, the production process itself may be revolutionized, necessitating the creation of entirely new relationships (Berik 1989). The impact of these transformations on the continuity and cohesiveness of communities, and on women's lives, can be profound. Income from a craft industry can give some individuals or households the ability to accumulate capital, creating unprecedented differentials of wealth which disintegrate local social ties (Waterbury 1989). In her work with petty commodity producers in La Paz, Buechler (1986) demonstrates the centrality of internal relations of production for understanding how women are positioned to deal with change.

In Bolivia, these issues are particularly salient because of the attempt hv the women of La Imilla to subvert the power of middlemen, to create an independent structure for home-based production, and to challenge the dependent position of women through educational programs which give women empowering knowledge and skills. Organizing has given women access to external sources of capital through project funding and the ability to increase control over their own productive activities, while simultaneously incorporating themselves directly into foreign markets. To a certain extent, this effectively overturns the position that rural Bolivian women have held in the global marketplace. Given the disadvantages faced by women in developing countries, knitters' success as entrepreneurs are striking.

But, despite the considerable gains achieved by knitting organizations such as La Imilla, a number of common problems continue to prevent greater success. In fact, these problems are so universally acknowledged by Andean knitting groups that they appear to have become a sort of litany. No matter how well a group is organized, or how well-made the product, obstacles to obtaining sufficient credit, the difficulty of designing fashionable products which appeal to consumers, and the inability to access markets in industrialized countries, limit the growth of cooperative knitting organizations. Moreover, many private sector vendors find it more profitable and easier not to work with organized groups, which may have the ability to command higher wages and improved work conditions. The position of knitters is made all the more difficult since many of the nascent knitwear exporters with whom grassroots organizations must now compete are middle-class Bolivians or foreigners who have both a fuller understanding of the sweater market and a greater capacity to contact and relate to clients. Grassroots groups are at an even further disadvantage if they cannot speak English, and if they lack telephone and fax equipment. While not-for-profit organizations and networks have been crucial clients for most Andean knitting organizations, this market remains too small to absorb the amount of knitwear which could be produced by women in need of income.

ATO Markets

Although middle class knitwear entrepreneurs have been able to develop a thriving business among private sector apparel retailers in the . and Europe, the principal customers for sweater exports produced by cooperative groups such as La Imilla have been a parallel market of not-for-profit organizations interested in the social welfare of knitters and their families. These organizations are commonly referred to as ATOs, or "Alternative Trading Organizations" because they are associated with an international movement to promote fair trade. The underlying philosophy of this movement is the recognition that one of the root causes of poverty is the dependence of smallscale producers on relations with middlemen, which are often exploitative (Coote 1992:66). ATOs generally attempt to circumvent this situation by buying products directly from third world artisans, and through special support services for groups, which operate with cooperative principals. There is even an initiative to create a label, similar to the "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" or the "green" mark ot environmentalists, that would identify products that are produced in a "people friendly" production process and that provide an acceptable level of remuneration to the producer. To date, this initiative has yet to gain momentum beyond the rather limited alternative trade market.

Alternative Trade Organizations, such as SELF HELP Crafts (a Mennonite organization), Oxfam Trading, and Pueblo to People have formed the bulk of the clientele for handknits from cooperative knitting organizations in Bolivia. Working with ATOs provides a number of important benefits to these groups. Through sales to ATOs, knitters gain access to markets, which they would otherwise not be able to reach. Many of the customers in this market purposely consume ATO products in order to support the philosophy of cooperative production and fair trade. ATOs have strong allegiance to a group once relations are established, and knitters can be assured of continued patronage from their ATO clients. In addition, ATOs tend to be much more flexible and understanding of the problems of production and supply often encountered by artisans in the third world, and will not cancel an order if it tails to amve on time. The downside of working with ATOs is that they are not strong in knitwear sales and have difficulty selling items as expensive as alpaca handknits. ATOs lack the specialist retail outlets necessary to market upscale knitwear products.

Expensive sweaters, as a rule, are items that people purchase for their own use, while ATO catalogues and stores are often geared toward the gift trade. Although catalogue sales of highpriced goods are on the increase, alpaca sweaters are too often marketed together with cheap artisan products from around the world creating an inappropriate context for high-fashion garments. The $100-150 price range for Bolivian handknits is already high for sweaters sold through ATO markets. This means that even well-intentioned ATOs cannot match private market prices, and therefore will be unable to raise the wage being paid to the knitter much above the current rate of $5-20 per sweater.

Although the logic of the ATOs is to benefit poor artisans by providing them with a link to the market, there is always the danger of too much of a good thing. Ideally, the Fair Trade Association network customers will buy only up to 30% from any one producer group in order to avoid creating dependency (Coote 1992). In reality, however, because of the difficulty in gaining access to other markets, many groups come to rely almost entirely on ATO clients. This creates problems in that ATO customers represent a very marginal consumer market, which is easily saturated with a particular item. ATO markets cannot possibly absorb the production capacity of Andean handknitters, and reliance on ATO customers means relatively low-volume, low-priced orders which limit the potential for women to find employment in export knitting. In addition, knitting organizations, which deal exclusively with ATOs, do not develop the skills and rigor necessary to operate in the open market. They come to believe that all clients will be as understanding with late, incomplete or mistaken orders as their ATO friends - a belief, which is quickly disproven when put into practice.

Credit and Raw Materials

Credit is a major problem in Bolivia for most people in general, and knitting organizations are no exception. Campesinos and the poor, especially women, are considered ignorant and backward by middle class Bolivians, and hence are deemed "bad risks" by the banking establishment. This makes it particularly difficult for knitters to obtain loans to finance the purchase of raw materials (Gibbs 1990). The women who founded La Imilla, for example, were unable to get a small loan to capitalize the purchase of wool for their new venture. In order to obtain the necessary funds, 12 of the women joined an agricultural cooperative with a revolving loan fund where they took-out personal loans. Investing personal capital in the collective venture was done at great risk to the financial security of their families, since titles to small family plots were held as collateral. Despite the risk, the women pooled their loans to purchase wool and began to knit.

Alpaca yarn is one of the things that makes Andean knitwear unique and exportable. The fiber of the alpaca is soft and luxurious, drapes beautifully, and because of its high lanolin content, it has qualities of warmth and water resistance superior to those of sheep's wool. Alpaca is also one of the things that makes Andean knitwear expensive. The supply of high-quality alpaca yarn in Peru and Bolivia is often erratic and a small number of companies have come to control so much of the market that they have developed virtual monopolies. Certain natural colors, such as pure black or pure white, are both less available and more in demand than mottled browns and grays. In Bolivia the problem has been particularly acute because of the higher price paid for raw wool in Peru. Thus, Bolivian wool producers have found ways to evade customs controls in order to sell their product at the higher going rate across the border. The result is an inadequate supply in Bolivia, and much of what is available has been re-imported at the inflated Peruvian price.

In Cochabamba there is now a medium-sized yarn factory run by a knitting organization affiliated with the Catholic Church. This has provided access to high-quality natural and dyed yarn for many groups in the area, which previously would have been forced to travel to La Paz or even to Peru to purchase the yarn they need. But the supply in Cochabamba continues to be erratic and when there is a dearth or a delay in supply, groups not directly affiliated with the Church organization are forced to wait. In addition, unaffiliated groups must purchase this wool at the export market rate which is currently about US$27-35 a kilo. This price reflects the dramatic inflation from the economic crisis of the past decade. In 1984 a kilo of alpaca sold for about US$. One year later the price had gone up by almost 350% to US$ (Self-Help World ). As if the difficulties of dealing with such rampant inflation alone were not enough, the exorbitant expense now required to purchase raw materials for knitwear production has exacerbated an already problematic financial situation for many groups. The vicious cycle of poverty means that without access to credit, few organizations are able to finance the purchase of raw materials to fill any substantial order for knitwear they receive from abroad without a cash advance. Needless to say, cash advances are hard to come by, and are rarely forthcoming, even in the alternative trade market.

Asociacion de Artesanfa y Moda (ADAM) 1

For a brief period during the 1980s, knitters in Bolivia began to hope that many of these problems could be solved. In response to knitters' stated needs, USAID sponsored the Asociacion de Artesania y Moda (ADAM), which was promoted as a marketing and technical training service for existing knitting organizations in Cochabamba (USAID 1985a). The price tag for this project was a whopping US$6 million over 5 years. Using this investment, ADAM was supposed to aid knitters in standardizing sweater sizing, and improving the design and quality of their products to be more appropriate for the . market. The increasing popularity of handcrafts in the . meant that the market potential for handknit alpaca sweaters was expanding. The marketing services provided to the groups by ADAM was supposed to provide access to markets which would be difficult or impossible for Andean handknitters to enter on their own. In particular, the upscale, luxury apparel market for fine handknits could command prices that would improve the wages, paid to knitters.

Regrettably, this project was an enormous failure. A USAID official in La Paz told me that it would have been better if they had just handed-out the money to the knitters. Indeed, it would have been. Not only was the inappropriately large investment squandered, but knitting organizations, believing that these services would significantly improve their sweater sales, entered into a relationship with ADAM which for many proved to be disastrous. Knitters were encouraged to take out loans made available through ADAM affiliation in order to capitalize the purchase of raw materials necessary to produce for the increase in new sales ADAM would provide. When ADAM failed to reach even one tenth of the projected sales, the knitting organizations were left repaying loans they could not afford.

Even more disruptive was the manner in which ADAM operated. Once initial relationships were established with existing knitting organizations, ADAM gained access to lists of knitters and clients already developed by the groups. Rather than ironing-out the very real problems inherent in working with grassroots organizations in Bolivia -- which was what knitters were expecting to happen -- ADAM's management used this information to enter into the production of a competing line of handknits. With the US$6 million of public funding as a subsidy for production, ADAM was able to undercut prices charged by other knitting groups. This gave ADAM an advantage in market sales and thus, the power to keep profit margins high and production costs low. In addition, ADAM's management began an ambitious investment campaign, speculating with ADAM funds. Using connections with government institutions and project funders, ADAM became involved in a scheme to corner the market for camelid fiber and create a private monopoly in the supply of raw materials for knitting exports (USAID 1988a). Needless to say, this project was not only a huge waste of money that could have been used effectively, but caused chaos and hardship for many knitters and their families.

Reasons for the glaring failure of ADAM are legion; not the least of which was incredibly poor management. Moreover, what the representatives of ADAM failed to make clear to knitters who believed the project to be a "development project," was that the management of ADAM was controlled by 5 prominent Cochabamba business people who - with an investment of $1000 apiece of their own money -- would eventually become full owners of the infrastructure established with USAID funding (USAID 1985a, 1985b, 1988a, 1988b). ADAM's policies were designed to turn artisan knitters into a sweater industry through exploitative production quotas made possible by further fragmenting the labor process and by controlling access to raw materials and markets -- classic capitalism at its best. In the context of the mid-1980s free market euphoria, ADAM documents laud the idea that with USAID funding, "all the elements of a profit-making business are in place"(USAID 1988a:25). This appears particularly contradictory given the "no risk" subsidy obtained by ADAM management from the pockets of . taxpayers. The experience of ADAM is a perfect example of the fiction of the free market which forms the basis of neo-liberal policy. In a speech at an annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank, George Bush stated that "the key to economic growth is setting individuals free - free to take risks, free to make choices, free to use their initiative and their abilities in the market place" (USAID : 1). Unfortunately, this growth-oriented perspective ignores the power relationships which structure market interactions - in the real world, some people are more "free"than others.

At the same time USAID mandated that knitters function "in a businesslike manner" (USAID 1985a), upper level management was not held to "real world" standards of skill and professionalism. A USAID evaluation explains ADAM's failure as the result of an "unfocused and poorly developed marketing strategy" (USAID 1988a: 15), yet suggests that "it is unrealistic and basically unfair to expect the ADAM board and staff to achieve the goals and objectives of the project without critical professional marketing and technical expertise which the project was designed to provide" (USAID 1988a:32 emphasis added). Successful artisan groups find it difficult or impossible to obtain loans to capitalize their operations at a level for export, yet members of the elite with no experience in producing or marketing sweaters easily obtained US$6 million of public funds to finance private investment, risk free. USAID's treatment of ADAM's directors as "ghosts in the machine" (Allen 1987) who would promote the development of the Bolivian knitwear industry without pretensions to personal gain, ignores real conflicts of interests which exist between knitters and Bolivian elite. The attitude expressed by a . State Department Official who said that "a lot of people are poor because they don't have the talent, skills or IQ to get out of poverty" (Helmore 1987), demonstrates the failure of . policy to acknowledge the significance of political influence and access to capital, or the impact of political and economic forces which favor elites while denying the majority of people an escape from "underdevelopment."

Current Market Challenges: Beyond ATOs

Despite the disruptive activities of ADAM, the Alpaca knitwear industry has expanded enormously over the past few years. The available supply of knitwear exports from Bolivia has increased as a result of dramatic improvements in communication and transportation, while the growing popularity of handmade goods in industrialized countries, and more recently, even among middle-class Bolivians, has created a burgeoning demand. Given this ripe context, private sweater companies have been able to break-in to rigorous luxury apparel and boutique markets in the . and Not surprisingly, entrepreneurs from a variety of sectors have been attracted to the industry by this enviable success with a low-tech product, and the three digit sales prices possible for high-fashion knitwear. Particularly appealing to knitters, and to development funding organizations working with women in Bolivia, has been the idea that since knitters possess the skills necessary to produce high-quality handknits, if they organize and work hard, they, too, can take advantage of this bullish climate. However, it has become clear that for grassroots organizations, entering into export markets is not so simple.

While the number of grassroots knitting groups has grown, most still produce primarily for ATO clients. The enormous expansion of the knitwear industry into upscale markets has occurred, instead, almost exclusively through the entrepreneurial system which cooperative groups had hoped to supplant. At the same time, a superficial understanding of the dynamics of the knitwear market has led many cooperative knitting organizations to assume that while they might lament their inability to participate in the expansion of the private market, they can ignore its success as it grows up around them. Since ATO orders provided a foundation in the past, they mistakenly believe that they can safely retreat into production for the parallel ATO market. However, current trends in both the ATO and the private market now threaten to undercut their unique cooperative strategy.

Interestingly, the growing popularity of handcrafts in the U. S. has not resulted in an automatic improvement in ATO sales. On the contrary, a glut of crafts being produced through exploitative middlemen and putting-out systems has hurt ATOs just as it threatens the groups themselves. Most customers are unaware of the conditions in which many crafts are produced, and others just do not care. At the same time, crafts available through these middlemen sell at much lower prices than those being offered by ATOs because the artisan's well-being is rarely a consideration in the calculation of wages. ATOs are often unable to compete in this market since for many consumers, the disparity between the cost of cheap imports and ATO products makes the ATO price seem unreasonable. Thus, at the same time that the need for knitters to find work is growing, the alternative market itself is in transition. A number of ATOs, which in the past have worked with Bolivian organizations, are being forced to rethink knitwear sales, and some have been unable to place the type of sizable orders that previously provided the backbone for cooperative production.

In addition, competition for ATO clients and for skilled knitters has intensified. In Bolivia, economic crisis, together with the vast influence of "projects" and "project aid," have led increasing numbers of women to organize groups with the idea of knitting for export. Because few knitters understand the nature of the knitwear market in the ., they see capturing ATO patrons as their primary objective. This situation has led to the development of a somewhat perverse dynamic as poor women now compete with each other for attention from the relatively scarce number of ATO clients. Each new knitting organization makes claim to a greater level of poverty and oppression than the others, attempting to demonstrate need of ATO patronage. ATOs find themselves in the position of spreading their resources and attentions more and more thinly. In this context, the ATO market is even less adequate to absorb increasing knitwear production and provide sufficient income for knitters.

In the past, one of the attractions of knitting for a grassroots organization has been the potential for better wages through cooperative management and production. Yet today, entrepreneurs selling in upscale markets have the ability to pay than more the ATO market and can lure the best skilled knitters by offering just a few cents more. This process is exacerbated by the current trends in alternative market knitwear sales described above and the increased competition between groups for ATO patronage. The resulting dearth of ATO orders has left knitters in cooperative organizations desperate for work. At the same time, booming sales in the private market tantalize knitters with the promise of a continuous supply of orders. For many, this income security is more important than the actual wage. Yet few private businesses offer knitters the empowerment, skills and knowledge which come through grassroots mobilization. In most cases, despite improvements in the current wage, knitting in a privately owned putting-out system remains just another labor intensive and low-paying job.

Prior to the emergence of grassroots knitting organizations in the 1970's and 1980's, knitwear production for export in Bolivia was controlled by private companies, which provided a structure for organized production and a connection to markets in other countries. Today, groups such as La Imilla have demonstrated that with strong leadership and organization, knitters can compete with the private market in the production of high-quality hand-knits. Yet, although grassroots organizing has provided an alternative structure for production, the inability of knitters to redefine their relationship to the market continues to inhibit their greater success in overthrowing the old system. Marketing and design services, such as ADAM was supposed to provide, are key aspects of this relationship. As long as knitters lack direct access to markets and to fashionable designs, obtaining clients beyond the ATO market will remain nearly impossible. Nevertheless, making the transition from ATOs to more upscale fashion markets can be seen as a necessary step for grassroots knitters. Not only do private market orders have the potential to provide more employment at higher wages, but moving beyond the subsidized ATO markets will allow grassroots organizations to become less dependent. And perhaps even more crucial, moving into the private market has become an issue of organizational survival, given the current state of the industry.

Alpaca Works

THE ANDEAN KNITWEAR DESIGN AND MARKETING PROJECT

In response to the continuing need for market services expressed by successful knitwear producers, a much less ambitious, yet clearly more realistic project was initiated with funding from Oxfam Trading. ATOs were eager for more stylish designs and had been pushing knitting groups to offer sweaters with more appeal to customers in the . and Europe. As a result, a number of knitting organizations requested assistance in developing their capacity to respond to the tastes of the market. So in 1988 when an established British sweater designer, Vanessa Keegan, contacted a number of the groups as part of her research for a book on traditional Andean designs, they recruited her to organize some design workshops. The following year Vanessa began collaborating with three groups in Bolivia (La Imilla, Senior de Mayo, La Khochalita) and one in Peru (Minka) on an initiative called The Andean Knitwear Design and Marketing Project, which was later renamed "Alpaca Works."

The main goals of the project were similar to those hypothetically motivating ADAM - to help already existing knitwear producing groups improve the design and quality of their products, to expand the market for those products beyond the limited Alternative Trade market, and to train knitters to accurately and adequately calculate the costs of production and distribution (Millard 1992; Alpaca Works 1992). But unlike the for-profit motives of ADAM, Alpaca Works was organized as a not-for-profit institution. During the first three years of operation, from 1989 to 1992, the project was able to reverse the trend of declining orders among participating groups, and to raise the number of clients outside of ATOs from 2 to 11, which increased sales from US$5000 in the first year to US$65,000 in the third (Millard 1992; Alpaca Works 1992). As a result of the improved design and marketing, the project succeeded in raising the export price of a sweater from $48 to $68, and the wage being paid to the knitter increased by at least 30% to approximately $18. Many women benefited from the expanded opportunity for employment at increased wages.

Standing alone, this success is laudable. Comparing the US$30,000 a year budget of this project with the US$6 million lost by ADAM, these improvements are even more noteworthy. However, since these initial successes, serious problems have emerged. Although Alpaca Works operations continue, the longterm viability of the project remains unclear. All of the original groups left the project as a result of disagreements, and once again, La Imilla and the others find themselves without access to new designs and market contacts. The nature of the problems, which have plagued the Alpaca Works project highlight some common challenges faced by cooperative knitwear producers. The underlying causes of the specific problems are a complex combination of personal rivalry, flawed project design, the dynamics of grassroots organizing, and NGO politics. A complete analysis of the Alpaca Works project is too detailed to be presented in the limited space of this Although it is difficult to separate out specific issues from a densely woven organizational dynamic, the focus here will be more explicitly on understanding how design and marketing played a key role in the way that problems unfolded.

SWEATER DESIGN

Design is one of the aspects of knitwear production and export challenging the success of groups like La Imilla. It is a problem which does not appear to be completely resolvable in the short-run. When most people think of Andean alpaca sweaters they picture a relatively poor quality garment with llama designs around the neckline. In fact, Andean sweaters are of such notoriously bad quality that in order to get customers to even consider looking at the sweaters, some groups are forced to refer to them as being made of a "very soft wool," rather than mentioning that they are made of alpaca. However, with inroads by entrepreneurs and knitting groups into upscale markets over the past few years, this situation is beginning to change. Many customers now understand that there is a wide range of quality available for Andean handknits. This could be advantageous to some cooperative knitting organizations, since it gives them the opportunity to emphasize extremely highquality knitting, and because the beauty and luxury of the alpaca could be a selling point rather than a liability. Sweaters with llamas and other designs usually identified as "traditional" Andean sweaters are still produced and sold by these groups. The difference is in the high quality of the material and the craftsmanship, rather than in the design. However, these sweaters appeal to a sort of "ethnic" market that is very narrow in the ., and only somewhat larger in Europe. ATOs are able to sell a limited amount of higher priced "traditional" sweaters to people willing to pay more to support the artisans, but in general ethnic market knitwear sells for a much lower price. Vanessa's experience in the high-end sweater market gave her the idea which launched Alpaca Works - that with fashionable design and appropriate marketing, grassroots exporters could compete with private entrepreneurs for upscale, luxury markets where prices are high, with the objective of raising the wage paid to the knitter. To do this requires garments which are exclusive and "high" fashion. Designs may incorporate "traditional" Andean symbols, patterns and colors to give a sweater an "ethnic" flavor, but in a way that is contemporary and fashionable rather than distinctly ethnic.

The problems confronting a group of peasant women in the Andes who are attempting to design high fashion sweaters are obvious. Not only do Andean knitters have little understanding of ephemeral consumer tastes in industrialized countries, but knowledge of the vicissitudes of fashion trends requires continuous and immediate contact with the consumer market. Moreover, knitters cannot realistically expect to compete with professional designers in this market price range who can earn over $80,000 for a single collection. Oxfam Trading does print a "Fashion Forecast" guide for ATO producers, which includes information about the basic shapes and colors which are in vogue for each season. Knitwear design, however, involves a subtle combination of color, shape and texture which requires more sophisticated analysis to keep up with the latest fashions. Given these difficulties, the role played in the Alpaca Works project by Vanessa Keegan has been key. Her expertise, designs and experience, together with her commitment to working with grassroots knitters, provided impetus for establishing the project in the first place. The original idea was that Vanessa would teach design workshops that would give the women the skills necessary to begin to design their own sweaters. Some knitters I spoke with still seem to think that they will eventually be able to design their own sweaters, but according to Vanessa, this did not prove tenable. Even working with magazines and pictures, the designs produced by the knitters themselves in these workshops did result in salable merchandise, especially for the upscale market. Instead, the project now relies primarily on designs created by Vanessa, and most of the groups are facing the reality that design services will continue to be necessary. Design workshops are still held at least once a year, but are now a formal setting for knitters to learn the new designs Vanessa has developed rather than an opportunity for knitters to create their own designs.

Experience with the successful sales of Alpaca Works' sweaters and the demands of clients for new product lines, have made knitters realize the importance of good design. Yet the subjective nature of design and the actual work a designer does are not well understood by knitters, and they have come to resent their position in this process. When knitters have no creative input, the rote and labor-intensive nature of hand-knitting can become exaggerated, and result in a sense of alienation. Furthermore, because knitters do not understand the capriciousness of fashion trends, designs, that are difficult to knit appear as Vanessa's personal caprice or even as vindictiveness.' And, to compound the complexity of the situation, among knitters there is still the underlying belief that designing a sweater is not "work," and that almost anyone can produce good designs. This contradiction is one of the factors contributing to the dysfunctional dynamics which have developed within the Alpaca Works project.

In order to understand sweater design, it is necessary to comprehend not only the concept of "fashion," but also the structure of the market for handknits in the . Because knitters are not familiar with either, they have only a superficial understanding of the relationship between Vanessa's work and successful sales. The situation is exacerbated by the role of Alpaca Works as a "development project." Funding received by Alpaca Works to pay for designs has resulted in misunderstandings between knitters and the project. Because Vanessa is willing to do this work for a relatively low salary, knitters do not realize how much it would cost to hire someone to do an equivalent job. The design services that Vanessa provides to Alpaca Works for under $20,000 because of her commitment to working with grassroots organizations, could not be had for triple that price on the open market. And that is not to mention the amount it would cost to hire someone to fill her role in administration of the project, or even finding a designer familiar with the export market who would be willing to work in Bolivia. Moreover, Vanessa has given the project access to her old clients in cities such as New York, Washington, and London, where she had already established a name for her designs. It is difficult to put a precise price tag on these more intangible assets. However, because $20,000 is a great deal of money from the perspective of the knitters, there is a belief that Vanessa is getting rich off of the project.

ENTERING THE UPSCALE, NON-ATO MARKET

Even with good designs, successfully entering the luxury market is a difficult process. The experience of working with ATOs rarely prepares knitters for the exigencies of knitting for private market clients. ATOs seek-out cooperative producers in their home countries and often attempt to establish relatively personalized relations. Most of the ATOs that purchase Bolivian knitwear work with artisans from many different countries and have the capacity to act as importer for the goods. With ATOs knitters do not perceive any real negative repercussions from late or mistaken orders. In the private market, on the other hand, stores and boutiques depend upon a local sales representative who will bring merchandise to be shown to the store's buyer.

The sales representative is crucial since the process of placing orders can take days or months. While the buyer and the representative may establish a friendly relationship, knitters remain anonymous in this process. Most stores require that the producer be responsible for delivery since few are prepared to import orders on their own. This means that the for private market sales the groups must also have an importer to accept the goods. And finally, in the private market, quality and ontime delivery are essential. Orders which are not up to standard or which arrive late are sent back.

When the project first attempted to market the new designs in 1990, Vanessa was the sole representative for the groups on a whirlwind month-long trip to the . and Britain. But it was clear that Vanessa's annual visits would not provide sufficient contact with the market for the group's products. The project needed a representative in the ., and an importer to accept the goods. By year two, with more than a bit of luck and some contacts, Vanessa found a sales representative for the groups in New York. Marlene Rigby was already representing a highpriced range of cotton sweaters from an Australian designer, and felt that the alpaca range would complement those she was already showing. In addition, she fell in love with Vanessa's designs, and was supportive of the social goals of the project. Agreeing to work on the basis of a 10% commission to be placed on top of the export price, she became responsible for bringing the sweaters around to customers and taking orders. Because through her cotton line Marlene already had her foot in the door at some of the exclusive boutiques and big department stores, she was able to show the sweaters to clients which are normally impossible to get in to see. Her enthusiastic personality landed many sales with otherwise tentative and wary buyers.

The designs were well received, yet problems with importing the sweaters remained since Marlene was not a licensed customs agent. After a good deal of negotiating, the ATO "SELF HELP Crafts" agreed to act as the importer for the project and to distribute orders to the clients. SELF HELP was a long-time client of La Imilla and was supportive of the possibility of expanding the market for handknits. As part of the agreement with the project, SELF HELP would import the sweaters and bill the clients, but would also advance payment to the knitters. This was a major coup, since raw materials are so expensive, and receipt of payment from clients is commonly delayed for months. La Imilla had the unfortunate experience of a client going out of business yet failing to cancel an order. With this system, SELF HELP rather than the knitters, would take on the risk.

Sales rose as a result of these changes. The high quality of the knitting, and the beauty of the alpaca and the designs, together with Marlene's good sales pitch, generated enthusiasm among the customers. However, representing four separate groups proved to be too complicated. This is when Vanessa and Marlene developed the name "Alpaca Works" to serve as a unifying marketing concept for all of the project's sweaters. A swing tag with the umbrella label "Alpaca Works" and a blurb describing the project was attached to each sweater. Using the umbrella label greatly simplified things for promoting sales and for payment. In addition, the swing tag was seen as an important way of educating the public about the product and about the project. A well-designed tag can catch the eye of both sociallycommitted and fashion-conscious consumers. For example, undyed and natural dye alpaca products currently enjoy great appeal to "green" markets. Most buyers, however, are not interested in making a social statement through the sweaters they wear. Instead, private sweater companies have learned how to use swing tags to emphasize alpaca sweaters as exotic handknits. One label (Casa Fisher) describes the knitters as "400 handknitters located in remote villages in the beautiful Cochabamba valley high in the Andes;" another (Fortrama) claims that their sweaters were "produced with the skill of their ancient Incan ancestors ;" while a third (Casa Fisher) emphasizes that alpaca was used to produce clothing for the Inca elite and by purchasing an alpaca sweater, you can "add that touch of Incan royalty to your fine wardrobe." Alpaca Works used the swing tag to emphasize the luxury quality of alpaca while drawing attention to the social and economic condition of the producer.

Despite having all the pieces in place, the situation began to deteriorate. In 1993, at the same time that increasing conflict between Alpaca Works and the knitting groups was making production more difficult, Marlene submitted her resignation. The agent who took over representation of the project runs a showroom in Boston, but subsequent sales have been poor. To make matters worse, in 1995 SELF HELP withdrew from its role as importer for the project. In both cases, the decision to stop working with Alpaca Works occurred because of inequities which had developed in the operation of the project. Although Marlene had been willing to risk working at a slight loss while the project established itself, even after the first year she was making almost nothing for her efforts. Many of the faxes, mail and phone calls to Bolivia, Marlene paid for out of her own pocket. Beyond this, many of the orders she worked diligently to obtain were ultimately made meaningless when the client canceled or refused the shipment because delivery was delayed. When this occurred, Marlene received no payment for all of the work she had done up until that point. Similarly, despite the percentage that was placed on top of the sweater price to help cover SELF HELP's costs, by 1994 losses had mounted. SELF HELP was suffering large and increasing deficits for its entire operations as a result of trends in the craft market. Beyond this, on knitwear imports SELF HELF was doing so poorly as a result of having advanced money for the sweaters to the project. Consequently, SELF HELP was saddled with a large number of returned orders when the project failed to meet delivery dates.

Clearly, the initial success of the project was unraveling. At the same time, disputes within, and rivalry between the knitting groups involved with the project, together with conflict between the groups and Alpaca Works made coordinating production difficult, and resulted in mistakes and delays. Although the dynamics of the Alpaca Works project generated some of these production problems, the groups themselves were primarily responsible for most of the delays. Production was so behind schedule that at one point in 1992, Alpaca Works was faced with having to produce more than 1000 sweaters for delivery in one month. Even working with more than 100 knitters, this was an impossible task. With a great deal of effort and by putting-out some of the production to other groups and knitters, the orders to the most demanding stores were sent off more or less on time. But long-time ATO clients were forced to wait as much as two months. This significantly affected Pueblo to People's sweater sales that season, since few customers are willing to buy a relatively expensive sweater that has been placed on indefinite back order. Even a key Macy's order arrived without enough time for the window dressers to organize a display of Alpaca Works' garments which had been planned. Since 1992, production has improved, but delays remain commonplace.

The implications of such production failures go beyond missing the deadline for any particular order. Not only do delays negatively affect both the sales representative and the importer, but, ultimately, the knitters themselves suffer. Boutiques and stores organize their sales in order to have complementary lines of clothing displayed at the same time. Delivery dates are scheduled with this in mind. Clients whose orders arrive late are unlikely to order again since late orders can disrupt the "concept" they plan to market for a particular season. When a client fails to re-order, the energy that the salesperson expended in building that relationship is wasted. In addition, delays tarnish the reputation of Alpaca Works, of the groups, and of Andean handknits in general. A reputation for delayed delivery will have a long-term impact upon the ability of Alpaca Works to make successful sales in the future. But, perhaps it is the short-term effect of late delivery which offers the biggest risk. Clients often purposely over-order, or when sales are down they may be unable to accept any more merchandise. Lateness then becomes an excuse for the client to refuse delivery of a sweater order. The result is not only a lost sale, but now that SELF HELP is no longer picking up the slack, the groups must pay the transportation and customs bill for the returned order, and are then saddled with a stock of sweaters which they may not be able to sell. Clearly, production delays represent a very serious problem for grassroots knitters. Although for Alpaca Works, disaster has been narrowly avoided a number of times, the persistence of production problems threatens the future stability and success of the project.

Furthermore, in the ., continuing economic recession hampers the expectation of clients to be able to sell large numbers of expensive handknits. Currently, the market will not bear much more than US$200 for sweaters in high-end boutiques,5 and prices need to stay below US$100 to be salable in less exclusive stores and ATOs. One of the primary objectives of the project has been to raise the wage paid to the knitters by entering luxury markets where higher prices can be fetched for handknits. It was hoped that by offering extremely reasonable prices for Alpaca Works' garments in the first years, the project could overcome the quality and delivery fears clients have about buying from Andean organizations. The idea was that once the project had established a reputation for high-quality, on-time performance6 among a clientele pleased with the product, the prices would slowly be raised to increase remuneration to the knitter. So far, while clients have been enthusiastic about the extremely low prices of the early years, there has been resistance to price increases in subsequent seasons. At a craft workshop for artisans from different countries sponsored in 1993 by the Craft Center in Washington, DC, the buyer for the Smithsonian gift stores warned that she sees this as a frequent mistake made by many alternative groups, and that rarely are prices successfully raised after clients become accustomed to the lower charges. The case of Bolivian sweaters is made even more complicated by the fact that knitters do not understand the market for their products in the . Their success with sales at the increased US$68 price is significantly more than they had previously been making, and they know that the final sales price can be hundreds of dollars. This has led knitters to believe that the . is really "buzzing" about their sweaters, and that people are willing and able to pay even more. These assumptions are not necessarily in tune with reality.

Because the price of the sweater has gone up by more than US$20, on top of the costs of importation and distribution which must be calculated into the final sales price, a number of previous clients have not re-ordered. Macy's assistant buyer told me that most Macy's customers are not sophisticated they want value. With the new price to the client now at approximately US$ 100, Macy's would have to sell the sweaters for over US$200 in order to make their expected profit margin. In addition, ATOs have been happy to have new, more

contemporary designs, yet have resisted any rise in price. Eventually ATOs may have to settle for a less sophisticated, less time-consuming line of products developed with their price limitations in mind, rather than being offered the same designs available to boutique market customers. And finally, while alpaca garments remain unique, Andean knitters are increasingly facing competition. In China, knitters appear to work for almost nothing, while a potentially bigger threat is developing with the emergence of an alpaca industry in Australia that could destroy the quality which makes Andean handknits unique.'

Ultimately, neither ADAM nor Alpaca Works were able to internalize the costs of marketing and design. This became a key factor in the way both projects unfolded. In the case of ADAM, the price of the sweater bore no relationship whatsoever to the cost of production. The multi-million dollar project budget allowed ADAM management to operate as if they had unlimited funds. Alpaca Works, while certainly not comparable to the ADAM debacle in that sense, was similarly unable to make the final sales price reflect the entire cost of producing and selling the sweater. One part of the problem is that knitters do not understand the real costs that go into designing and marketing knitwear - and thus, were unwilling to pay for these services. Yet also problematic is the willingness of individuals, projects, and ATOs to provide subsidies. While members of the elite may have access to unlimited sources of "subsidy," as is made clear by the ADAM experience, for knitters the subsidies such as those provided by Marlene, SELF HELP and Vanessa eventually come to an end. When this occurs, knitters are left unable to compete in "real world" markets.

Conclusion

In increasing numbers, women are being incorporated directly into the global economy through the production of handcrafts for export (see Nash 1993). Rarely do consumers reflect on how production for the international market may affect local populations, nor is much attention paid to the realities of poverty which dominate the lives of rural producers in many parts of the world. Consumers of Bolivian sweaters want the uniqueness of handknits, but they do not want or are unable tc pay what it would cost to produce such a garment without the relative inequality of wages which exists for third world artisans Raising the amount paid to the knitter to approximate minimum wages in industrialized countries quickly outstrips the ability of the market to bear higher sweater prices. In fact, the handknil export industry in Bolivia is actually predicated upon the undervaluation of women's labor.

Yet, despite this inherent weakness in their position, which is exacerbated by economic crisis in the rural economy, some women have been able to take advantage of the expanding market for crafts through cooperative production. Mobilization at the grassroots level has given knitters more control over their productive activities, and the opportunity to develop skills and acquire knowledge. Women are empowered by this process. But the option of cooperative production remains closed to all but a few until knitters gain access to a broader market for their goods. Currently, the ATO market is the principal outlet for cooperative knitwear producers. This market is not sufficient to absorb production and cannot pay high prices which yield a decent wage to the knitter. In addition, while ATO patronage is an important factor in the success of grassroots organizations and ATOs provide a number of essential benefits to groups, the subsidized ATO market can create dependency for organizations struggling to obtain more autonomy. Only by expanding beyond ATO markets can knitwear producers hope to develop a sustainable alternative. Yet this expansion has remained elusive.

The transition from ATO's has been thwarted by the continuing inability of knitters to redefine their relationship to the market and to overcome internal contradictions of their own organization. Expansion of the market for cooperatively produced knitwear hinges on knowledge of marketing and design to open up markets where private knitwear entrepreneurs are enjoying such success. So far, it has not been possible for indigenous Bolivian knitters to acquire such skills, nor have they been able to develop a workable, ongoing relationship with others who might be able to fill the gaps in their own knowledge. Moreover, conflicts within the cooperative knitting organizations themselves generate production problems which have continued to undermine gains made in marketing and design.

In Bolivia, as throughout the world, artisans are dependent upon income from the sale of crafts. Development specialists and communities increasingly see craft production as a vehicle for socio-economic development and empowerment. Craft production and women's grassroots cooperatives are often presented in a romantic light as a panacea for eliminating poverty. Although in Bolivia the production of handknit sweaters for export has provided a base around which women have mobilized for broader social change, this example demonstrates the limitations of such cooperative endeavors. Through mobilization at the grassroots level, knitters have been able to establish an alternative to the production system found in private industry. Yet they remain captive to exploitation by middlemen. The case of ADAM showed how poor people continue to be defeated by the power of elites, even when they do all of the "right" neoliberal things. In Alpaca Works, we can see how the market itself works against attempts at change, and not insignificantly, how the reality of "cooperative" production rarely lives up to idealized visions of grassroots organizations as a clear alternative to the private market. Cooperation at the local level is not sufficient to affect the structural position of knitters in the global market for handknits. Nor is grassroots participation a prescription in and of itself for the challenges of producing and selling in the competitive knitwear market.

NOTES

1 See Page-Reeves 1992, 1993, and 1998 (forthcoming) for a more detailed discussion of ADAM.

2Most notably are Milma, Casa Fisher, and Asarti. 3For an elaboration of this discussion, see Page-Reeves 1998 (forthcoming).

4For example, before collaborating with Vanessa, the groups tended

to knit small, tight-fitting sweaters and rarely produced sizes large enough for many Europeans and Americans. Vanessa helped the groups to rectify and standardize their sizing to fit the export market, but because today styles are loose and baggy, the new sizes appear to be outlandishly huge. Similarly, the current fashion in the more expensive sweater market is for elaborate and textured designs which often include 10 to 20 colors in complex combinations and stitches, and even hand-embroidery over the finished knit. These trends reflect the increasing incorporation of women from ever-poorer regions and countries into the global economy, who (because of necessity) are willing to perform labor-intensive knitting for low wages. Unfortunately for Andean knitters, in order to enter the high-priced,

luxury market, this means producing competitive garments. 5There are a few exceptions, such as the Peruvian Connection Catalogue, but this market is not large enough to employ the number of women who wish to knit.

'Obviously, with all of the production problems and delivery delays, this reputation has not been established. 7Alpacas have been imported into Australia where the arid climate provides a similar environment to their native home in the Andean altiplano. Australian alpacas are being raised in a more regulated way with enriched feed and herd management, ostensibly leading to high quality fiber.

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The author is a . candidate in the Department of Anthropology at the City University of New York and a Visiting Fellow in the Department of Latin American Studies at Cornell University. Research for this article was conducted with essential funding from a Fulbright-Hays Fellowship, a grant from the Inter-American Foundation, a FLAS fellowship for Quechua study from Cornell University and the Root Fellowship for Foreign Language study from the Kappa Kappa Gamma Foundation. Special thanks to the knitters of La Imilla for their inspiration, to Vanessa Keegan and Marlene Rigby for their cooperation, and to June Nash and Jane Schneider for their support. I would also like to acknowledge the insightful comments of the reviewers which helped to improve the presentation of the material.